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Captain William Fetterman And All 80 Of His Men Were Killed In Under An Hour In 1866. The Army Said He Died By A Friend’s Pistol, And A Lakota Warrior Said He Killed Him With A Club

At a quarter to one on the afternoon of December 21, 1866, an infantry captain named Tenodor Ten Eyck reached the top of a ridge in what is now northern Wyoming.

He had about seventy-five soldiers with him, nearly all of them on foot.

He had been sent to find eighty-one others.

They had gone over that same ridge a little more than an hour earlier behind Captain William Fetterman.

Heavy firing had been heard from the far side at noon, and it had died away while Ten Eyck climbed.

He looked down.

The valley below him was full of mounted men, Lakota and Cheyenne and Arapaho.

They were calling up to his soldiers to come down and fight.

Of Fetterman and his command he could see nothing at all.

A picture made in our own time shows what a viewer expects to find on the other side of that ridge.

The sky in it is the color of old paper.

Dry yellow grass and gray sagebrush run back to a line of low hills, and a row of horsemen with lances waits along the horizon.

In the middle of the plain a ring of small fires burns low on bare ground.

Inside the ring stand two tall split timbers joined by a crossbar, and an Army officer is roped upright against them.

He wears a dark blue coat with shoulder straps and brass buttons, sky-blue trousers with a yellow stripe, and black boots.

Heavy rope is wound around his chest, his knees and his ankles.

His head is tipped back, and he is looking up at the sky.

A bare-chested man with eagle feathers in his long black hair and a red sash over one shoulder stands facing him with a burning brand in his hand.

Two more men wait behind, one with a tall lance and one with a stone-headed club.

At the far left three soldiers stand in a row, and each of them is tied to a post of his own.

The scene is an artist’s invention.

No soldier of Fetterman’s command was taken alive that day.

Nobody was tied to a post, and no ring of fire was lit.

The men who won the fight left many accounts of it, and so did the Army, and nothing of the kind is in any of them.

It was also four days before Christmas, with ice on the slopes, and there is no winter in the picture at all.

What Ten Eyck’s men found when the valley emptied was simpler.

All eighty-one lay along about a mile of the ridge road, and every one of them was dead.

They had died fighting, in well under an hour.

Three things have been said about that hour ever since.

The first is a boast.

Fetterman is supposed to have said that with eighty men he could ride through the whole Sioux nation, and eighty men rode out behind him.

Nobody has found that sentence in print before 1904.

The second is a name.

The Lakota called the fight the Hundred in the Hand, after a promise that was made to them the day before it was fought.

The third is the way the captain died.

His commanding officer reported that Fetterman and a brother officer had turned their revolvers on each other at the end.

The post surgeon examined the body and testified to something else.

In later years an Oglala Lakota named American Horse gave the surgeon’s answer from the other side.

He said that he had killed the captain himself, and that he had done it with a war club and a knife.

The road came first.

—

## The road to the gold

The road was the Bozeman Trail.

It left the old emigrant route on the North Platte River and ran northwest along the foot of the Bighorn Mountains to the gold camps of Montana.

It was shorter than any other way by hundreds of miles, and about thirty-five hundred people traveled it between 1864 and 1866.

It also ran straight through the Powder River country.

By the Fort Laramie treaty of 1851 the United States had recognized that country as belonging to the nations who lived on it.

On paper it was the land of the Crow.

In the 1850s the Lakota and their Cheyenne and Arapaho allies had pushed the Crow out, and by 1866 it was the best buffalo range the three nations had left.

No treaty had ever made it American.

The people who hunted there had fresh reasons to distrust soldiers.

On November 29, 1864, Colorado volunteers under Colonel John Chivington had fallen on a camp of Southern Cheyenne and Arapaho at Sand Creek.

The camp believed itself at peace.

Most of the dead were women, children and old people, and the volunteers cut up the bodies and carried pieces of them away.

The government’s own inquiries established that.

Survivors carried the story north in 1865 to their Northern Cheyenne and Lakota relatives.

That August an Army column marched into the Powder River country itself and destroyed an Arapaho village on the Tongue River.

In June 1866 the government called the Lakota leaders to Fort Laramie to buy their consent to the road.

The talks were still going on when Colonel Henry Carrington marched in on June 13 with the 18th Infantry.

He was on his way north to build forts along the very road under discussion.

An Oglala war leader named Red Cloud understood what that meant.

As Army families afterward remembered his words, he said that the soldiers had come to steal the road before the Lakota had answered yes or no.

He left the council, and other leaders left with him.

The commissioners signed with those who stayed and reported to Washington that the “most cordial feeling prevails.”

Carrington went north.

—

## The fort on the Piney

Henry Carrington was forty-two years old, a Connecticut man, a Yale graduate and a lawyer.

He had been colonel of the 18th Infantry since 1861.

He had spent the Civil War raising and organizing troops, and he had never led the regiment in battle.

What he could do was build.

He left Fort Laramie on June 17 with about seven hundred soldiers, three hundred civilians, two hundred and twenty-six wagons, a regimental band of thirty-five and a thousand cattle.

On July 14 he chose a plateau between the forks of Piney Creek, in what was then Dakota Territory, and began Fort Phil Kearny.

In August he sent two companies some ninety miles farther up the trail to build a second post, Fort C. F. Smith.

Phil Kearny was a stockade of heavy pine logs with barracks, quarters, stables and a sawmill.

All of that timber came from a pine wood some miles to the west, and so nearly every working day a train of wagons went out to it under armed guard.

Two pieces of high ground matter to this story.

South of the fort stood Pilot Hill, where pickets watched the wood road and signaled with flags.

To the north, between two and three miles off, ran a long bare height called Lodge Trail Ridge.

The Bozeman road climbed over it, and nothing beyond its crest could be seen from the fort.

The fort was under a slow siege from its first week.

Between July 16 and September 27 there were fifteen attacks near it, and they killed six soldiers and twenty-eight civilians and ran off several hundred animals.

Carrington wrote again and again for more men, more horses and better weapons.

His infantry still carried the muzzle-loading rifles of the Civil War, with which a steady man fired three or four shots a minute.

His wife Margaret kept a journal through all of it.

In 1868 she published it as a book, and she gave it a Crow name: Ab-sa-ra-ka, Home of the Crows.

—

## The captain

Captain William Judd Fetterman reached the fort on November 3.

He was about thirty-three, born in Connecticut, the orphaned son of a West Point officer.

He had joined the 18th Infantry as a lieutenant in 1861 and had fought with it through the whole war.

In the Atlanta campaign he commanded a battalion of it at Resaca, Kennesaw Mountain and Jonesboro.

He came out a brevet lieutenant colonel, which was an honorary rank given for gallantry, and in the shrunken peacetime Army he was a captain again.

So the regiment’s colonel had never seen it fight, and its newest captain had led it under fire.

Margaret Carrington set down the opinion he arrived with.

He believed, she wrote, that “a company of regulars could whip a thousand, and a regiment could whip the whole array of hostile tribes.”

It was not an unusual opinion.

Captain Frederick Brown, the regimental quartermaster, talked the same way, and so did Lieutenant George Grummond.

Brown had orders for a new post and said that he would not leave until he had Red Cloud’s scalp.

Grummond was an infantry officer who had been given charge of the mounted men, and his wife Frances was expecting a child.

Fetterman’s first real fight on the Piney came on December 6.

The wood train was attacked, and Carrington tried to catch the attackers between two columns.

The cavalry got out ahead and scattered after a few riders who kept just out of reach.

Lieutenant Bingham followed them over Lodge Trail Ridge and was killed there with Sergeant Bowers, and several men were wounded.

The colonel’s own party was nearly cut off.

Fetterman came back sobered.

By Margaret Carrington’s account he came in and said that he had “learned a lesson, and that this Indian war has become a hand-to-hand fight, requiring the utmost caution.”

He added that he wanted no more such risks.

She gives both of his opinions in reported speech.

Put back into the captain’s own mouth, they come to four short sentences.

“A company of regulars could whip a thousand.”

“A regiment could whip the whole array of hostile tribes.”

“I have learned a lesson.”

“This Indian war has become a hand-to-hand fight.”

The last two were spoken fifteen days before he died.

The watchers on the hills had learned something that day as well.

A handful of riders who seemed easy to catch could pull soldiers over that ridge.

On December 19 they tried it again.

Carrington sent out Captain James Powell with orders not to go beyond Lodge Trail Ridge, and Powell drove the attackers off, stopped at the crest and came home.

On December 20 Fetterman and Brown asked leave to take fifty of the fort’s civilian employees and strike the Lakota camp on the Tongue River.

Carrington refused.

—

## A hundred or more

The camps lay along the Tongue River, a long day’s ride to the north.

The largest were Lakota: Red Cloud’s Oglala and the Miniconjou, with some Brulé among them.

With them were Northern Cheyenne and Northern Arapaho, outnumbered by the Lakota about three to one.

Together they could put well over a thousand fighting men in the field, and most estimates run from fifteen hundred to two thousand.

A Cheyenne named White Elk, who was there, believed that more men fought that day than fought Custer ten years later.

Red Cloud had done more than anyone to hold the alliance together, and he helped plan what followed.

Whether he was on the field is disputed, for the Cheyenne who talked to the writer George Bird Grinnell said that he was not, and other witnesses said that he was.

The leader most often named in the fighting is High Backbone of the Miniconjou, whom the whites called Hump.

Black Shield and Black Leg led other Lakota, and Dull Knife and Little Wolf were among the Cheyenne.

The Cheyenne, White Elk said, had been invited by the Lakota and came as a matter of friendship.

He added that soldiers at the fort had fired on some Cheyenne a few days earlier.

What they needed was a way to bring a large body of soldiers out of sight of the fort.

On December 20 the fighting men moved up toward the ridge.

There, by White Elk’s telling, the Lakota called on a person the Cheyenne described as a half-man-half-woman.

The Lakota word is winkte, a man who lived as a woman and was believed to see what was coming.

This person rode out over the hills toward the fort and came back four times.

The first time he said, “I have ten men, five in each hand; do you want them?”

The Lakota leaders answered that ten were not enough for so many people.

He rode out again and came back with twenty, and then with fifty, “twenty in one hand and thirty in the other.”

They told him each time that it was too few.

The fourth time he rode in hard and fell from his horse with his hands on the ground.

“Answer me quickly,” he said.

“I have a hundred or more.”

Everyone shouted, and men ran up and struck the ground beside his hands.

That is where the name comes from.

Other tellings give the words a little differently, but in all of them the promise is a hundred soldiers held in the hand.

That night ten young men were chosen as decoys.

White Elk listed them by nation: two Cheyenne, two Arapaho, and two from each of the three Lakota divisions in camp.

One of the Cheyenne was to be Little Wolf, and he gave the place and his horse to his brother Big Nose.

Tradition makes the leader of the ten a young Oglala named Crazy Horse, then about twenty-six.

He was very probably in the fight.

But White Elk named no Lakota decoy, Crazy Horse’s name does not appear in the account Grinnell took down from him, and the best-known stories of what he did on the slope were written long after he was dead.

His part in it is tradition and not testimony.

Beyond the ridge the road ran down a long narrow spur toward Peno Creek.

The Cheyenne and Arapaho hid on the west side of that spur.

Mounted Lakota waited behind two rocky ridges on the east, and Lakota on foot lay in the grass on the flat at its end.

A Cheyenne named Little Horse was to give the signal with his lance.

Then well over a thousand men lay still in the cold and waited.

—

## Friday, December 21

The morning was clear and cold.

About ten o’clock the wood train left the fort with an escort of nearly ninety soldiers.

Less than an hour later the pickets on Pilot Hill signaled that it was under attack.

Carrington ordered out a relief column.

He meant to give it to Captain Powell, who had obeyed him two days before.

Fetterman claimed the command by right of his brevet rank, and Carrington let him have it.

Forty-nine infantrymen from four companies fell in behind him.

Grummond followed with twenty-seven troopers of the 2nd Cavalry.

Captain Brown went along without asking the colonel, and two civilians rode with him, James Wheatley and Isaac Fisher, who carried new Henry repeating rifles.

That made three officers, seventy-six enlisted men and two civilians.

It was Fetterman and eighty.

What Carrington told him is the center of every later argument.

By the colonel’s sworn account, he ordered Fetterman to relieve the wood train and under no circumstances to “pursue over the ridge, that is Lodge Trail Ridge.”

He said that he gave the order twice, the second time from the sentry walk as the column went out of the gate.

He also sent a lieutenant named Wands after Grummond to repeat it.

Margaret Carrington printed the order as “to relieve the train, and under no circumstances to cross the ridge.”

Against that stands a silence.

No officer swore that he had heard the order given to Fetterman himself.

Several enlisted men said that they had, and the commission that investigated never called them.

There is also the road that Fetterman took.

He did not march west toward the wagons.

He went north, toward the ridge, as if to get behind the attackers and cut them off.

Carrington’s own first report says that the captain was “evidently moving wisely up the creek and along the southern slope of Lodge Trail Ridge.”

Some modern historians think that the two men had agreed on exactly that move.

Others hold that the order was plain and that Fetterman broke it.

The column left at about a quarter past eleven.

Soon afterward the pickets signaled that the wood train was safe, and the wagons went on to the pines.

The men who had attacked it, about forty of them, fell back toward the ridge and joined the ten decoys there.

They rode back and forth on the slope within rifle shot, close enough to be worth chasing and never close enough to catch.

At about half past eleven the column reached the crest.

It halted there for a moment in full view of the fort.

Then it went down the far side and out of sight.

Who went over first cannot be settled.

The mounted men were in front and on the flanks, and by one reconstruction they got more than a mile ahead of the infantry.

Grummond was known as an impetuous officer, and one reading of the day is that he went after the decoys and that Fetterman followed rather than leave twenty-seven troopers alone.

Fetterman commanded, and the responsibility was his in either case.

Nobody who could have explained the decision lived to do so.

—

## The far side of the ridge

The road ran down the spur for about a mile.

The decoys reached the creek at the bottom, and the cavalry and the two civilians were close behind them.

The infantry were strung out along the spur above.

Then Little Horse gave his signal, and the ground on both sides stood up.

What happened next has to be pieced together from the positions of the dead and from what Cheyenne and Lakota veterans said decades later, and the pieces do not fit perfectly.

At the far end Wheatley and Fisher got down among some rocks with a few of the troopers and worked their repeaters.

The rest of the cavalry fell back up the spur.

White Elk said that the foot soldiers took cover among large flat stones on the ridge.

A Lakota rode straight down the road through them, he said, and they let him pass and then shot him.

By White Elk’s account the infantry were overrun first.

The cavalry held a hill above them for a while and then backed slowly up the ridge, some of the men leading their horses.

The slope was icy and too steep for mounted fighting.

In the end the troopers turned their horses loose, and many warriors went after the horses.

The soldiers’ rifles mattered less than they should have.

A muzzle-loader takes about twenty seconds to load, and a man with a bow can loose several arrows in that time.

Few of the warriors had guns at all.

They fought with bows, lances, clubs and knives, and they came close.

White Elk remembered the arrows crossing over the soldiers so thickly that they looked like grasshoppers.

Men shooting from opposite sides of the spur hit each other, and at least one Lakota was killed by an arrow from his own side.

The cold deepened while they fought.

White Elk said that “blood running from wounds soon froze.”

The last stand was made among some boulders at the upper end of the spur, the end nearest the fort.

Fetterman and Brown were found there, in a tight cluster with most of the infantry.

It ended hand to hand.

Of the eighty-one, only six had died of gunshot wounds.

Tradition says that the last man on his feet was a bugler named Adolph Metzger, and that he fought with his bugle until it was beaten out of shape.

When it was over, White Elk said, someone saw a dog that had come out with the soldiers.

“All are dead but the dog; let him carry the news to the fort,” a man called.

Another answered, “No, do not let even a dog get away,” and a young man shot it with an arrow.

The victors’ own loss is uncertain.

Red Cloud later named eleven Oglala dead.

George Bent, who lived among the Cheyenne, heard fourteen for the whole force.

White Elk saw the Lakota dead laid out in two long rows, and he thought that there were fifty or sixty of them, with two Cheyenne.

A modern historian has collected twenty-one names.

The Army’s guesses ran much higher and rested on nothing that could be counted.

—

## What the fort heard

At the fort the firing was heard at about noon.

It came from the north, from beyond the ridge, heavy at first and then scattered.

Carrington sent Captain Ten Eyck out at once with about seventy-five men on foot, and soon afterward he sent forty-two more, and wagons.

Ten Eyck kept to the high ground and reached the crest at a quarter to one.

By then the valley was quiet.

He sent a rider back to say that the valley was full of warriors and that he could see nothing of Fetterman.

The men below shouted and beckoned.

They believed that the soldiers on the ridge had brought a mountain howitzer, and when nobody came down they began to draw off to the north.

Ten Eyck went down the road.

He came first on the boulders and the cluster of bodies around them.

Before dark his wagons carried forty-nine of the dead back to the fort.

He was afterward accused of slowness, and of worse, for the route he had chosen.

The times answer the charge.

The fight was nearly over before he could have reached it by any road.

Inside the stockade the women stood on the walks and watched the wagons come in.

Frances Grummond’s husband was not in them.

—

## A shot in the left temple

Carrington wrote his official report on January 3, 1867.

In it he said that Fetterman and Brown each had a revolver wound in the left temple.

Brown, he added, had always declared that he would keep a last shot for himself.

The colonel was convinced, he wrote, that the two friends had fallen by each other’s hand rather than be taken alive.

That is the substance of his words and not their exact form.

It became the accepted story at once.

The post surgeon, Samuel Horton, had examined the bodies.

When the investigators took his testimony in 1867, he described Fetterman’s wounds differently.

As historians report him, he found the captain’s chest cut across and his throat cut through to the spine, and he gave it as his opinion that those wounds had killed him.

The pistol wound in the temple he found on Brown.

So the medical evidence fits one officer who shot himself and one who did not.

The other half of the answer came from the Lakota.

American Horse was an Oglala, about twenty-six years old in 1866, and in later life a well-known leader and a son-in-law of Red Cloud.

He said that he had killed the officer who led the soldiers.

By his account he struck Fetterman down with his war club and then cut his throat.

It is one man’s claim, and no second witness stands behind it.

A few writers have tried to keep both stories by supposing that the captain shot himself a moment before the club fell.

But American Horse’s claim agrees with the surgeon, and the colonel’s story does not.

Most historians of the fight now set the double suicide aside.

Carrington was not necessarily lying.

He saw two friends lying together with terrible wounds, he knew what Brown had always said, and he wrote the ending that an officer would have wished for them.

—

## What was done to the dead

The same report contains a passage that the Army kept out of print for twenty years.

It describes the condition of the bodies.

The dead had been stripped and scalped.

Most had been cut, broken and dismembered, and Carrington set the injuries down one by one in a list that fills a long paragraph.

Wheatley’s body alone held more than a hundred arrows.

The list need not be repeated here.

The colonel believed that some of his men had suffered these things alive.

Most historians think that the injuries were made after death, though nobody can say that of every man on that ridge.

There are explanations, and none of them is an excuse.

Historians of Plains warfare point to a belief that an enemy enters the next world in the body he is left with.

They point also to Sand Creek.

Two years earlier American soldiers had done the same things to Cheyenne and Arapaho dead, women and children among them.

The encyclopedia of Wyoming’s own historical society calls the treatment of Fetterman’s men retaliation for it.

The soldiers who gathered the bodies did not weigh explanations.

They carried what they had seen for the rest of their lives, and so did the Army.

One body was treated differently.

By the tradition of the post, the bugler Metzger was found unmarked, with a buffalo robe laid over him.

—

## The night after

Carrington expected the fort to be attacked, and he had fewer men left to hold it than he liked to count.

Even so, he would not leave thirty-two of his dead on the ridge.

His officers objected.

He answered, in substance, that he would not let the Lakota believe the Army’s dead could not be brought in.

On December 22 he went out himself with about eighty men.

By the account of Frances Grummond, written many years later, he first left an order at the powder magazine.

If the fort fell while he was gone, the women and children were to be put inside it, and it was to be blown up.

He found the rest of the dead along the lower road, Grummond among them, and Wheatley and Fisher at the far end.

That night a blizzard came down off the mountains, and the temperature fell far below zero.

No attack came.

The fighting men had done what they came to do, and the great camp on the Tongue was already breaking up for the winter.

The news went south with a civilian named John Phillips, called Portugee because he had been born in the Azores.

He left the fort on the night of the fight with the colonel’s dispatches.

He covered two hundred and thirty-six miles to Fort Laramie in four days, through that same storm, and walked in late on Christmas night while the officers were holding a ball.

Legend has him riding alone on the colonel’s best horse.

The Army’s pay records name at least one other rider who was hired with him.

The ride was real all the same.

—

## Who was to blame

The newspapers called it a massacre and looked for a man to blame.

They chose Carrington.

General William Sherman, who commanded the whole region, wrote to General Grant a week after the fight.

The Army, he said, must act with “vindictive earnestness” against the Sioux, even to the extermination of men, women and children.

Carrington was relieved of the post.

His successor arrived on January 16, and a week later the colonel left for the south in bitter cold, with the women and children in wagons.

In the spring of 1867 an Army court and a special commission took testimony.

The commission cleared Carrington.

It found that the fort had been given too few men and too little of everything else.

Its findings were not published, and neither was the colonel’s report.

For twenty years, then, his defense rested on his wife’s book.

Margaret Carrington’s journal came out in 1868, and it is the first place where Fetterman appears as the officer who thought a company could whip a thousand.

She died in 1870.

The next year the colonel married Frances Grummond.

In 1887 the Senate at last printed his report.

In 1903 a popular historian named Cyrus Townsend Brady interviewed the old man, and Carrington read the manuscript before it went to press.

Brady’s book of 1904 is where the famous boast first appears.

It says that Fetterman offered with eighty men “to ride through the whole Sioux Nation.”

In the form most often repeated today it runs, “Give me eighty men and I can ride through the whole Sioux nation.”

No letter, report or testimony from 1866 or 1867 contains either form.

In 1908 Carrington, then eighty-four, went back to the ridge to dedicate a stone monument.

In his speech he remembered the words another way.

There the captain says, “I can take 80 men and go to Tongue River.”

That sounds much less like a boast about a nation than like the request of December 20, which the colonel refused.

Frances Carrington’s own book followed in 1910 and repeated Brady.

So the sentence that hangs over Fetterman’s name was written down thirty-eight years after his death, by a writer working with the one man who most needed him to have said it.

The number in it is the number that died with him.

That is either a terrible coincidence or the mark of a story improved in the telling.

Modern historians have divided over the rest.

One school holds that Fetterman was a careful and well-liked professional, that Grummond began the rush, and that the Carringtons built the reckless captain afterward.

Another agrees that the boast is false and still holds that he disobeyed a clear order.

Both arguments share a blind spot.

They treat the day as something that American officers did wrong.

On the far side of the ridge nothing went wrong at all.

Three nations had planned for weeks, chosen their ground, sent ten men to do the most dangerous work, and kept well over a thousand others still and silent through a winter morning.

The battle was lost by the Army, and it was also won by the men who fought it.

—

## Wagon boxes and a burned fort

The war went on for two more summers.

In 1867 the garrisons finally received breech-loading rifles, which a soldier could fire eight or ten times a minute.

On August 1 a hay-cutting party near Fort C. F. Smith held off a large Lakota and Cheyenne force from behind a log corral.

The next day, a few miles from Fort Phil Kearny, twenty-six soldiers and six civilians did the same from inside a ring of fourteen wagon boxes set on the ground.

Their commander was Captain James Powell, the officer whom Fetterman had outranked on the morning of December 21.

They held for hours, until a relief column came out, and lost three men killed inside the ring.

The Army called the two fights victories, and in a narrow sense they were.

But the road stayed closed.

No emigrant train could travel it, and the railroad building across the plains to the south was about to make it useless.

In 1868 the government offered terms.

The new treaty of Fort Laramie set aside a great reservation that included the Black Hills.

It declared the Powder River country “unceded Indian territory,” where no white person could settle or even pass without consent.

And it gave up the road.

Red Cloud would not sign until the soldiers were gone.

That summer the garrisons of all three forts marched away.

Within a day or two the empty posts were burned, and tradition gives the burning of Fort Phil Kearny to Little Wolf’s Cheyenne.

Red Cloud signed in November.

It is hard to find another war that the United States ended by giving its opponents what they had fought for.

The Crow were less fortunate.

The country was theirs by the treaty of 1851, they had accepted the forts, and that same spring they signed a large part of it away.

The victory lasted eight years.

Gold was found in the Black Hills in 1874, and in 1876 the Army came back.

Many of the men who had lain in the grass along Peno Creek fought that June on the Little Bighorn.

The Black Hills were taken the following year.

In 1980 the Supreme Court ruled that they had been taken illegally and awarded compensation, which the Lakota have refused to accept.

Red Cloud lived on the reservation until 1909.

American Horse traveled with Buffalo Bill’s show, rode in a presidential inauguration parade in 1905, and died in 1908.

Carrington died in 1912, still defending his order.

White Elk walked the ridge with Grinnell forty-eight years after the fight and pointed out where each body of men had been.

In 1888 his remains and those of his men were moved to the cemetery at the Little Bighorn, where they lie now near the dead of another command that did not come back.

—

## Eighty-one

Look at the picture once more.

An officer is roped to two timbers inside a ring of small fires.

A man stands in front of him with a burning brand, and three soldiers wait at their posts.

It is a picture of helplessness, and it puts all of the cruelty on one side.

The record has no helpless men in it.

The eighty-one who went over Lodge Trail Ridge were armed, and they were led by officers who wanted the fight.

They were sent, or sent themselves, into a country that no treaty had given them.

The men waiting there were defending the last good hunting ground they had, on land that they had themselves taken from the Crow.

They did not capture anyone.

They killed every soldier in the fight, in less than an hour, and then they did to the dead what Carrington wrote down and the Army hid.

All of that is in the documents, and none of it needs a post or a fire to be terrible.

The picture also leaves out the three sentences that matter most.

One was spoken by a rider who fell from his horse with his hands on the ground and promised a hundred or more.

One was spoken, if it was spoken at all, by a captain who is supposed to have asked for eighty.

The third is the best attested of the three, because the colonel’s wife printed it within two years.

Fifteen days before he died, Fetterman said that he had learned a lesson, and that this had become a hand-to-hand fight requiring the utmost caution.

The rider promised a hundred.

The boast, when somebody finally wrote it down, said eighty.

The wagons brought in eighty-one.

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